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CLD-225        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________  
 
No. 13-4397 
 
ANTHONY BOLA OLOPADE, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-01063) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on a Motion for Summary Affirmance 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 10, 2014 
 Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed: April 16, 2014 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Anthony Bola Olopade appeals from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his complaint.  Because no 
substantial question is raised by the appeal, we will grant the Government’s motion to 
 2 
 
summarily affirm the District Court’s decision.  We may affirm a district court for any 
reason supported by the record.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted). 
 Olopade filed a document in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 8 
U.S.C. § 1503, seeking a declaration that he is a United States national.
1
  The District 
Court entered an order informing Olopade that the action was not proper under § 2241 
because he was not seeking release from custody,
2
 and thus the filing would be construed 
as a complaint seeking declaratory relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201.  
After granting Olopade’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court screened the 
complaint and determined that it should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Olopade timely appealed the District Court’s order.  The 
Government moved to summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment; Olopade has filed 
a response in opposition to summary action.
3
 
 When a District Court grants a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, it should 
screen the complaint to determine whether it states a claim upon which relief may be 
                                                 
1
 A “national” is “(A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a 
citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(22). 
 
2
 We need not decide whether the District Court should have considered the claim in the 
context of a habeas proceeding, because Olopade’s claims are without merit, as explained 
herein. 
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granted.  If the complaint fails to state a claim, the Court should dismiss it.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).  While we normally require a court to give the plaintiff an opportunity to 
amend, a complaint may be dismissed without allowing such an opportunity if 
amendment would be futile.  Day v. Florida, 743 F.3d 40, 43 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 Here, the District Court determined that Olopade’s claim for a judicial declaration 
of citizenship was not properly before it, as the statute governing such claims prohibits a 
person from bringing such a claim “if the issue of such person’s status as a national of the 
United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with any removal proceeding . . ., 
or (2) is in issue in any such removal proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).  Olopade raised 
his claim of U.S. citizenship in his removal proceedings, but the Immigration Judge and 
Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his claim.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 2 (citing In re: 
Anthony Olopade, 2010 WL 4035443 (BIA Sept. 21, 2010)).
4
  In Rios-Valenzuela v. 
DHS, 506 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2007), the Court declined to read § 1503’s “exception 
as forever hanging an albatross around the neck of those who first raise citizenship as a 
defense in a removal proceeding.”  Rather, the Court determined that if “a citizenship 
claim finds its genesis outside of the context of removal proceedings, the exception is no 
bar to jurisdiction; thus, for example, once removal proceedings have run their full course 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
 We also have the benefit of Olopade’s document titled, “Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Appellant’s Opening Brief.”  
4
 The District Court also noted that Olopade had unsuccessfully raised the same claims in 
an action filed under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 in the United States District Court for the Northern 
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and terminated, any future citizenship claim would not arise in those removal 
proceedings.”  (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted).  Id.  Although Olopade’s removal 
proceedings have terminated, the genesis of Olopade’s citizenship claim was a defense he 
raised to a removal order.  See  In re: Anthony Olopade, 2010 WL 4035443 (BIA Sept. 
21, 2010); see also Rios-Valenzuela, 506 F.3d at 398-99 (jurisdictional bar applies where 
the particular citizenship claim “arose” in removal proceeding, even if those proceedings 
have ended; if person loses in removal proceedings, appropriate means for judicial review 
is through petition for review).
5
   
 As noted, the District Court determined that Olopade’s action was not proper as a 
§ 2241 petition.  But persons have long enjoyed the right to have their citizenship claims 
determined in habeas proceedings.  See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285 
(1922); Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 2005).
6
  While the REAL ID Act 
stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over petitions for review of removal orders,  
see Kumarasamy v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 169, 172 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006), the Act did not 
specifically preclude habeas review over claims of citizenship raised outside of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
District of Ohio.  See Olopade v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 4:04-cv-0035 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 
2004). 
5
 We take judicial notice that Olopade has had such judicial review.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected his citizenship claim raised 
in his petition for review.  See C.A. No. 04-2706 (1st Cir. July 7, 2006). 
 
6
 Olopade is in custody pursuant to a criminal conviction, but the fact that he is subject to 
a final removal order may suffice to meet the “in custody” requirements for habeas 
jurisdiction.  Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 324 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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context of a challenge to a removal order.  Cf. Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 
712 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that § 1252(b)(9) “does not provide a ‘clear statement’ 
foreclosing habeas review” of a challenge to immigration detention based on pre-final-
removal-order claim of citizenship); Verde-Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen., 734 F.3d 198, 206-
07 (3d Cir. 2013) (REAL ID Act does not foreclose habeas jurisdiction to challenge 
something other than a final order of removal); see generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289, 314 (2001) (explicit direction from Congress required before courts will construe 
statutes as limiting habeas relief).  We need not determine whether the District Court 
retained habeas jurisdiction to consider Olopade’s claim, however, as the petition was 
properly dismissed as being without merit.  28 U.S.C. § 2243. 
 In his complaint (or habeas petition), Olopade claimed that he had registered for 
the selective service, and that he had applied for citizenship.  He argued that “he is a 
United States Citizen because he completed all that was required him to do to become a 
United States Citizen, except the ceremonial swearing of the proceeding where he would 
have been given his certificate of Citizenship.”  Complaint at 3.  In Salim v. Ashcroft, 
350 F.3d 307, 310 (3d Cir. 2003), we held that a person cannot be declared a national 
based on a citizenship application; rather, “for one . . . who is a citizen of another 
country, nothing less than citizenship will show ‘permanent allegiance to the United 
States.’”  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(22)).   We cited with approval Perdomo-Padilla 
v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that a person can only become 
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a national through birth or through completing the naturalization process.  Salim, 350 
F.3d at 309.  Olopade, by his own admission, never completed the process.   
 Olopade cited two cases in his complaint in support of his contention that he 
should be declared a U.S. citizen:  In re: Petition of Tubig in Behalf of Tubig, 559 F. 
Supp. 2, 4 (N.D. Cal. 1981), and Harriott v. Ashcroft, 277 F. Supp. 2d 538, 545 (E.D. Pa. 
2003).  He stated that the courts in those cases “granted the petitioners [sic] request and 
declared them Citizenships [sic] based on the agency’s delay in processing their 
Citizenship application[s].”  Complaint at 4-5.  We are not bound by the decisions of 
district courts, but in any event, the cases are inapposite.  First, both cases involved a 
person seeking to derive citizenship from a parent; a process that happens by operation of 
law if the parent has completed certain steps before the child’s 18th birthday; i.e., unlike 
Olopade’s situation, the person seeking citizenship did not personally have to do 
anything.  Second, both cases granted relief based on equitable estoppel, holding that the 
agency’s delay was equivalent to affirmative misconduct.  Tubig, 559 F. Supp. at 3-4; 
Harriott, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 544; but see Mustanich v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1084, 1089 
(9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting INS v. Pangilian, 486 U.S. 875 (1988), as precluding 
establishment of citizenship by estoppel where statutory requirements for naturalization 
have not been satisfied).  Olopade’s complaint did not allege any delay on the part of the 
agency.  Instead, he complained about representations by the Department of Homeland 
Security that he believes influenced the Immigration Judge’s factual findings.  Olopade’s 
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allegations suggest negligence, at best, and not affirmative misconduct on the part of the 
Government.  Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006) (petitioner “must 
establish (1) a misrepresentation; (2) upon which he reasonably relied; (3) to his 
detriment; and (4) affirmative misconduct” to establish equitable estoppel claim against 
Government in immigration context). 
   Because the declaratory judgment matter was not properly before the District 
Court, and because there was no merit in a habeas claim that Olopade might bring, the 
District Court properly dismissed the complaint.  For the foregoing reasons, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
